is that truth becomes radically non-epistemic; that is to say, according to M. R., even a theory that is ideal in every way might turn out to be false. This consequence of M. R. Putnam finds to be unintelligible, and the modelling argument is designed to show just that, viz. that this consequence of M. R. lacks intelligibility.
Let T| be an ideal theory by our lights. Now, the argument against the intelligibility of the claim that T, might be false runs thus: I assume THE WORLD has (or can be broken into) infinitely many pieces. I also assume T, says there are infinitely many things (so in this respect T t is "objectively right" about THE WORLD). Now T t is consistent (by hypothesis) and has (only) infinite models. The most crucial part of this argument is the claim (number 7 above) that if SAT is taken as the intended interpretation of 'reference' for T., then holders of T. , will have to accept it for their theory too, even though they know that that makes T. +1 FALSE (SAT). But why should they have to do that? Being rational, they will reject SAT as the intended interpretation of •reference' for T t+ ,.
And holders of T fc can figure out as much.
So why does Koethe think that holders of T. are committed to supposing that if SAT is taken by them as the intended interpretation of 'reference' for T. , then holders of T fc+1 have to hold SAT to be the intended interpretation of 'reference' for T fc+ . too? (It is not clear Koethe holds this. But fie does not clearly distinguish between this line of argument and line B, which will be described below.) 12 The only answer that Koethe can give is that anyone who holds premise 3 and also holds that SAT is the intended interpretation of 'reference' for T fc is committed to holding that SAT is the intended interpretation of reference for T fc -(since reference of most terms is supposed to be preserved in the transition from T t to T fc+1 ).
But 3 is open to two interpretations: Notice that 3' is false, whereas 3" may well be true. And more to the point, it is not 3' that Putnam holds, but 3".
3') For most terms that the new theory (T t+] ) and the old theory (T.) have in common, these terms as oc-
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So if Koethe is to use a picture of theory-evolution acceptable to Putnam, he must hold the second interpretation of 3. But also notice that for the above argument to go through Koethe requires 3' rather than 3". It is only those who hold 3' who are committed (on holding SAT to be the intended interpretation of 'reference' for T. ) to holding that SAT be the intended interpretation of 'reference' for
On the other hand, those who hold 3" will conclude that later theorists will probably reject SAT as the intended interpretation for T t + i« an< * they will also conclude that (since later theorists hold 3") later theorist will reject SAT as the intended interpretation of 'reference' for T. too.
So the absurd consequence that is supposed to follow from acceptance (by holders of T.) of SAT as the intended relation of •reference' for T. will not follow and, hence, 7 and 9 above will be false. So, in conclusion, if 3 is understood as 3', the argument above will be unacceptable to Putnam (and is probably unsound) and if 3 if understood as 3", the argument above will be invalid because in that case 7 does not follow from 4, 5 and 6 or any of the preceding propositions. 
9) This gives holders of T. legitimate grounds at t for rejecting SAT as the intended interpretation of 'reference* for T t and for rejecting TRUE (SAT) as the intended interpretation of 'true' for T fc .
Furthermore, Koethe holds that it is not necessary that holders of T. know that T fc will be replaced by T t+l' i fc * s enough that for all they know it is possible that T. will be replaced by T. +1 -So, according to him, the above argument should work against any theory T. such that its adherents are not in a position to know that it won't be replaced. That is to say, according to Koethe, this refutation works against any application of the model-theoretic argument to a theory that is open to revision. Only an application of the model-theoretic argument to a theory which is not open to revision-is unrevisable, and unrevisable in principle-escapes this refutation, or so Koethe claims. Therefore, a property an ideal theory such as T t for which the model-theoretic argument is supposed to work has to be that T t is unrevisable. Thus Koethe says, "it is important to emphasize that this reply does not require that T. actually have an incompatible successor which is operationally verified at t+1. It is enough that the proponents of T. are not in a position to know, at t, that it will not, and hence have to admit the possibility that rational later speakers will accept a theory inconsistent with T t ."
M
Ill
The suspicious part in the above argument (B) is 9. Why should the fact (leave alone the possibility) that someone else is later going to reject their (i.e. the- 
